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Abstract: 
 
Science aims at understanding phenomena. One natural candidate for illuminating scientific 
understanding is explanation. Certainly, an explanation could contribute to someone’s 
understanding. But it is controversial whether explanations must produce understanding, whether 
understanding always involves some explanation, and whether there can be understanding 
without explanation. In Understanding Scientific Understanding, Henk de Regt sheds light on 
the relation between explanation and understanding by offering a unique account of scientific 
understanding, with an eye on how understanding is achieved. This account—which draws on 
two decades of his research—is presented in a form that is pleasant to read, accessible to a 
variety of readers, embedded in the longstanding philosophical debate about scientific 
explanations, and buttressed with numerous examples and three in-depth case studies from the 
history of physics. Although de Regt every so often points to examples from other sciences, such 
as biology, his account is tailored to physics. At best, he convinces his readers that it generalizes 
to other natural sciences. But whether it can accommodate social sciences or economics is not 
evident, as de Regt himself admits (see 11 and 261). 
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Science aims at understanding phenomena. One natural candidate for illuminating scientific 
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understanding. But it is controversial whether explanations must produce understanding, whether 
understanding always involves some explanation, and whether there can be understanding 
without explanation. In Understanding Scientific Understanding, Henk de Regt sheds light on 
the relation between explanation and understanding by offering a unique account of scientific 
understanding, with an eye on how understanding is achieved. This account—which draws on 
two decades of his research—is presented in a form that is pleasant to read, accessible to a 
variety of readers, embedded in the longstanding philosophical debate about scientific 
explanations, and buttressed with numerous examples and three in-depth case studies from the 
history of physics. Although de Regt every so often points to examples from other sciences, such 
as biology, his account is tailored to physics. At best, he convinces his readers that it generalizes 
to other natural sciences. But whether it can accommodate social sciences or economics is not 
evident, as de Regt himself admits (see 11 and 261). 
 
de Regt’s account follows an approach that considers the analysis of scientific practice to be the 
driving source of philosophical accounts of science (cf. Chapters 1.2 and 8.3). He aims at 
a rational reconstruction of scientists’ criteria for understanding, based on and evaluated by 
historical studies of physics. Although de Regt only mentions it in passing, his account of 
understanding is primarily concerned with understanding why or explanatory understanding (cf. 
fn. 1 on 2, and 96). Other forms of understanding, such as understanding how or so-
called objectual understanding, are not tackled. Another constraint is that de Regt focuses on 
what he calls the macro-level, science as a whole, and meso-level, scientific communities, 
instead of the micro-level, scientists (90). He aims at analyzing what it means for a scientific 
community, rather than a single subject, to achieve understanding. Moreover, he is not concerned 
with the phenomenology of understanding (20–23). According to de Regt, understanding why 
always involves some explanation why p; there is no understanding why without explanation. 
Yet, there could be explanations that do not provide understanding; these are explanations that 
lack an intelligibility feature (92): 
 
Criterion of Understanding Phenomena (CUP): A phenomenon P is understood 
scientifically if and only if there is an explanation of P that is based on an intelligible 
theory T and conforms to the basic epistemic values of empirical adequacy and internal 
consistency. 
 
In other words, a phenomenon is understood iff there is an explanation that is (i) based on an 
intelligible theory, (ii) empirically adequate, (iii) and internally consistent. According to de Regt, 
explanations are arguments in a broad sense (24–25). And he argues in favor of pluralism about 
explanations (Chapter 3). de Regt does not say much about the last two constraints, but takes it to 
be rather self-evident that any understanding providing explanation features them, although 
perhaps to different extents (36–38, and 93). His focus lies on the intelligibility criterion, which 
is intersubjectively defined (40): 
 
Intelligibility: the value that scientists attribute to the cluster of qualities of a theory (in 
one or more of its representations) that facilitate the use of the theory. 
 
Intelligibility is what one could call a cluster concept, i.e., a concept whose application does not 
require that all characterizing features are fulfilled. According to de Regt, the prime qualities are 
(1) visualizability, (2) appeal to causes, and (3) unification (56). Other qualities are simplicity, 
continuity, etc. The main use of a theory regarding understanding why is the construction of 
explanatory models of the phenomena in question. de Regt also offers an instance of an 
intelligibility criterion (102): 
 
Criterion for the Intelligibility of Theories (CIT1): A scientific theory T (in one or more 
of its representations) is intelligible for scientists (in context C) if they can recognize the 
qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without performing exact calculations. 
 
Importantly, this is just one criterion. Theories can be intelligible in other ways. In fact, 
according to de Regt, intelligibility is not just a cluster concept; it is a concept whose 
characterizing features can vary across contexts and scientific communities (on the meso-level). 
Intelligibility is a context-sensitive notion. For instance, whether visualizability is part of the 
cluster or not varies among communities. This renders understanding context-sensitive, too. de 
Regt underpins the context-sensitivity claim and CIT1 with the aid of detailed case studies of 
research on gravity in Chapter 5, the use of mechanical models in nineteenth-century physics in 
Chapter 6, and the role of visualizability in quantum physics in Chapter 7. 
 
de Regt’s proposal to provide a unified notion of understanding in terms of intelligibility is 
promising. It also seems to be plausible that intelligibility is a cluster concept that varies across 
scientific communities, diachronically and synchronically. In my opinion, however, de Regt’s 
account faces a couple of challenges. Some of these have been pointed out by Khalifa (2017), 
such as the issue that his notion of a theory, which allows for a collection of loosely 
circumscribed theoretical principles, and his notion of being based on a theory, which allows for 
a theory to just play some constraining role, are arguably too broad (97–98). I focus on additional 
issues. 
 
First, the object of analysis needs to be better specified. He seems to conflate the question of 
what is required for acquiring understanding and the question of what understanding consists in: 
“But what does it mean to seek or to achieve such understanding? What exactly is scientific 
understanding? This is the question that this book aspires to answer” (2, my italics). de Regt 
mainly tackles acquisition and CUP only provides (allegedly) necessary and together sufficient 
criteria for understanding (95). At best, his rough characterization of understanding phenomena 
(UP) gestures toward an answer to the constitution question: “UP … = having an adequate 
explanation of the phenomena” (23). Yet, de Regt remains silent on what having explanations 
involves, at the micro-, meso-, or macro-level. 
 
Second, CUP does not seem to provide a sufficient criterion. The existence of an explanation 
might well be crucial for acquiring understanding, but it does not seem sufficient. As de Regt 
emphasizes, understanding is a “three-term relation” between a phenomenon, an explanation, and 
a subject, be it an individual or subjects in a community (19). So, understanding must involve 
some subjects that take an epistemic stance toward the explanation. If de Regt wants to claim 
that the construction of an appropriate explanation already suffices for understanding, he needs 
to argue for it. 
 
Third, and relatedly, CUP does not incorporate de Regt’s claim that understanding 
requires epistemic accessibility (84). Perhaps de Regt would like to maintain that someone must 
craft the understanding providing explanation. But then the question arises whether access for a 
single individual would be enough or whether the number of scientists depends on the group 
size, e.g., mainstream physicists versus a group of pioneering physicists. 
 
Fourth, de Regt claims that understanding can come in degrees (43 and 135). However, he does 
not outline how his account could accommodate this claim. In their current forms, neither CUP 
nor the intelligibility characterization can accommodate degrees. Intelligibility might be 
analyzed as coming in degrees, but it is not clear whether degrees of understanding, if existent, 
are measurable in terms of intelligibility. It seems more natural to assume that the content of the 
understanding providing explanation is crucial; a richer explanation might lead to more 
understanding, etc. 
 
Fifth, de Regt proposes a relationship between explanation and understanding that seems to 
contradict CUP. He claims that understanding a phenomenon is the product of explanations (e.g., 
45, 86, and 96). However, if understanding is the product of explanations, there is no explanation 
without understanding. Yet, according to CUP, only explanations that fulfill the conditions (i)–
(iii), above, can provide understanding. Perhaps de Regt endorses the weaker claim that 
understanding is a potential product of explanations. He sometimes states that understanding is 
the goal (e.g., 12, 25, and 45), which would be compatible with a weaker claim. But if so, he 
should be clearer on this crucial claim. 
 
Sixth, de Regt sells CIT1 as a sufficient condition (cf. footnote 15 on 102). So, contra what he 
suggests elsewhere (101 and 271), CIT1 cannot be a test for whether or not a theory is 
intelligible, since it is not a necessary condition. More importantly, CIT1 seems to describe 
a manifestation of, rather than a condition for, intelligibility. A recognition of a theory’s 
consequences seems to be a manifestation of the facilitation of the use of that theory. Moreover, 
CIT1 commits de Regt to claiming that citing a correlation can provide understanding (122). If 
CIT1 were just about manifestation, he need not commit to such a controversial claim. 
 
So, there seems to be need for further development of de Regt’s account. Yet, it is undoubtedly 
an important contribution to the field. It involves many valuable insights, promising theses, and 
excellently crafted in-depth case studies. 
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